Small Modular Reactors: From Blueprint to First Concrete — Where Eurasia Enters the Global SMR Race
Small modular reactors have spent a decade as a PowerPoint promise. In 2026 that changes. China's Linglong One is weeks away from becoming the world's first land-based commercial SMR; Uzbekistan poured first concrete on a Russian RITM-200N in March; Türkiye has signed an i-SMR cooperation with South Korea. Yet not one Western SMR is operating, NuScale's flagship US project collapsed, and the economics remain unproven. For a region building nuclear from a near-zero base, the SMR question is strategic before it is technical.
What an SMR actually is — and isn't
A small modular reactor is any reactor under 300 MWe whose components are factory-built and shipped to site rather than poured in place. The pitch is compelling: smaller footprint, enhanced passive safety, lower upfront capital, and — crucially for emerging economies — access to nuclear capacity without the decade-long, multi-billion-dollar construction marathon of a conventional gigawatt plant. The catch is equally important: as of mid-2026 there is no large, commercially operating SMR fleet anywhere in the world. Almost every design is still pre-commercial.
The global pipeline: China leads, the West stalls
The gap between East and West has become the defining feature of the SMR race. China's CNNC pushed Linglong One through an IAEA safety review back in 2016 — the first SMR to clear it — and is now on the verge of commercial operation. Russia already exports a floating model. The Western pipeline, by contrast, will not deliver commercial units before 2029 at the earliest.
| Project / Country | Capacity | Status (mid-2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Linglong One (ACP100) · China | 125 MWe | First land-based commercial SMR; cold tests done, start H1 2026 |
| Akademik Lomonosov · Russia | 2×35 MWe | Floating SMR, operating since 2020 (exportable model) |
| BWRX-300 (Darlington) · Canada | 300 MWe | Licensed construction site; ~2029 — closest Western project |
| NuScale (VOYGR) · USA | 77 MWe/mod | NRC-certified design; flagship Utah project cancelled 2023 |
| Rolls-Royce SMR · UK | 470 MWe | In Generic Design Assessment; not yet broken ground |
| i-SMR · South Korea | 170 MWe | Design approval targeted 2028, commercial ~2035 |
How big could this get? The forecasts
The studies disagree on the destination but agree on the direction. The OECD-NEA's SMR Dashboard Edition III (July 2025) catalogued 127 distinct SMR technologies worldwide; the IAEA tracks 80-plus designs in active development, with the United States alone fielding 18. On capacity, the NEA's ambitious case sees 375 GWe of SMRs by 2050; the IAEA's high scenario puts total nuclear at 992 GW by 2050 with SMRs supplying roughly a quarter of all new capacity added — though its low case keeps that share near 5 percent. Commercially, the SMR market is valued around $6.5 billion in 2025, rising toward $10.7 billion by 2033. The spread between the bullish and bearish cases is the real headline: this is a technology being underwritten politically before it is proven economically.
The new demand driver: AI data centres
What has revived SMR momentum is not the power grid — it is the hyperscaler. AI data centres need round-the-clock, carbon-free baseload at a scale and speed conventional plants cannot supply, and developers are now pairing compute campuses directly with nuclear. NuScale has openly repositioned toward data-centre demand, and "behind-the-meter" reactor-for-datacentre deals have become the sector's most credible near-term commercial pull. For Eurasia, the lesson is that SMR economics may first close not in the residential grid but in industrial and digital-infrastructure loads.
Eurasia's entry: Uzbekistan and Türkiye
Uzbekistan is building the region's first reactor as an integrated plant — two large VVER-1000 units plus two RITM-200N small modular reactors of 55 MWe each (a 190 MWt design adapted from Russia's nuclear icebreakers, 60-year design life). First concrete was poured at the Farish district, Jizzakh region site in March 2026, with phased commissioning of early facilities targeted by year-end. It is, in effect, Central Asia's debut in both large and small nuclear at once — built on the Rosatom relationship.
Türkiye is layering an SMR track onto its existing programme. Alongside the 4,800 MW Akkuyu plant (ROSATOM) and talks for Sinop and Thrace, Ankara signed a TÜNAŞ–KEPCO memorandum (Nov 2025) and an i-SMRDA–Nuclean SMR cooperation (June 2026) with South Korea. A quiet enabler sits behind that choice: a January 2025 IP settlement bars Korea's KHNP from bidding new reactors across most Western markets for 50 years — pushing Seoul toward partners like Türkiye and lifting Ankara's negotiating leverage.
The reality check
None of this guarantees electrons. SMRs still carry high first-of-a-kind capital cost, 7-to-10-year build timelines, immature licensing frameworks, and no commercially proven reference plant outside China and Russia's state programmes. Financing is the deepest constraint — long-tenor nuclear lending is hard to arrange in high-inflation, FX-volatile economies. Fuel supply, waste and public acceptance remain open questions.
The bottom line. The first commercial decade of SMRs will belong to state-backed programmes — China at home, Russia through exports — not the Western start-ups that wrote the early narrative. For Eurasian buyers the real value is not cheap near-term power; it is diversification and industrial entry: a seat in the global SMR supply chain rather than a stack of licence fees. The countries that treat SMRs as an industrial-policy instrument — localising components, building regulatory and engineering capacity — will gain far more than those that simply import a reactor. Atomic geopolitics, increasingly, is decided in the supply chain.