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The Importer's Advantage: Türkiye's Gas Distribution Model and the Lesson for a Net-Importer Central Asia

UzEnergyNews · Weekly Insight · ·8 min read·Türkçe sürümü →

Türkiye imports almost every cubic metre of gas it burns, yet it runs one of Europe's largest and cheapest distribution networks. Uzbekistan sat on one of Central Asia's great gas endowments, yet it became a net importer in 2023 and now rations supply through cold winters. The contrast reframes a question producer states have long answered upstream: energy security is decided as much by the distribution network as by the reservoir.

A network built on imported molecules

Türkiye consumed 58.6 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas in 2025, up 10% year on year, and imported 57.9 bcm of it; domestic production covered roughly 3.1 bcm. On any resource scorecard, Türkiye is structurally short. Downstream, the picture inverts. By the end of 2025 the distribution sector reached 22.8 million subscribers — the third-largest base in Europe — across a network of 235,000 km that grew 7.2% in a single year, reaching 81 provinces, 982 settlements and about 85% of the population. Supply arrives through a deliberately diversified chain: 76% by pipeline, 19% as CNG and 5% as LNG.

The network itself tells a maturity story. Of the 235,000 km, roughly 148,000 km is polyethylene and only about 22,000 km older steel — the profile of a system expanded recently and at scale rather than a legacy grid patched over decades. Demand concentrates where the economy is — Istanbul alone has 5.56 million subscribers, ahead of Ankara (1.99m) and Bursa (1.13m) — but the policy achievement is the long tail. Crucially, the build-out continues: more than $500 million invested in 2025, over $4 billion earmarked for 2025-2026, and 15,856 km of new line laid in a single year. None of it rests on cheap gas at the border; it rests on a downstream model that can finance itself.

How an importer made distribution investable

The mechanism is unglamorous but decisive. Distribution is run by private companies operating under the EPDK regulator within defined regions and tariffs, coordinated through GAZBİR, the distributors' association, which standardises data, training and technical certification. The regulated-return model gives investors a predictable basis to extend pipe into thinner, costlier settlements — work a state budget rarely prioritises. Residential prices remain heavily subsidised at about 2.74 euro-cents/kWh against a European capital-city average above 10, but the subsidy sits on top of, not instead of, an investable network. The pressure shows in the bill rather than the pipe: the average annual household gas cost reached 12,686 TL in 2025, up 55% — an inflation pass-through that keeps the system solvent without abandoning affordability.

2025🇹🇷 Türkiye (importer)🇺🇿 Uzbekistan (former producer)
Trade positionStructural importer (57.9 bcm imported)Net importer since 2023
Production~3.1 bcm~42 bcm (down from 61.6 in 2018)
Subscribers / access22.8m · ~85% of populationHousehold = largest draw (~42%)
Network235,000 km (+7.2%)Transmission bottlenecks, winter pressure loss
Residential price2.74 €c/kWh (subsidised)~0.74 €c/kWh ($0.008) — among world's lowest
Reform / investmentMature regulated model; $4bn+ in 2025-26Tariffs +71% then +54%; full deregulation 2026

The producer's paradox

Uzbekistan is the mirror image. Output has fallen from 61.6 bcm in 2018 to roughly 42 bcm in 2025, and the country crossed into net-importer status in 2023 — a symbolic break for a state whose identity was built on hydrocarbon abundance. The household sector is now the single largest consumer of gas (about 42%), ahead of power generation, so any supply gap lands directly on voters in winter. The price signal that might have curbed demand was, for years, almost absent: Uzbek households pay around $0.008/kWh, roughly eleven times below the global average and below even Türkiye's subsidised level. The result was predictable — demand production could not follow, recurrent winter shortages, industry told to stand down at peak, and gas-station restrictions reimposed as recently as January 2026. To plug the gap, Tashkent now buys 7 to 7.7 bcm of Russian gas through the Central Asia-Center system, with talk of rising toward 11 bcm.

Reform is now under way, and it moves in Türkiye's direction. The residential tariff rose from 380 to 650 UZS/m³ in 2024 and to 1,000 in May 2025; from 2026 prices track inflation, and a full deregulation of the gas price is planned for the year, with the Asian Development Bank financing transmission modernisation. These are precisely the choices — cost-reflective tariffs, an investable downstream, diversified supply — that Türkiye institutionalised earlier and that turned a permanent importer into a distribution leader.

Reserves are not resilience

The regional backdrop sharpens the point. Turkmenistan still produced 76.5 bcm in 2025, exporting the bulk to China while courting the long-delayed TAPI route toward Afghanistan, Pakistan and India; Azerbaijan remains a net exporter, supplying Türkiye among others. Within the Organization of Turkic States, reserves are not the constraint — distribution, regulation and pricing are. Yet not every element of the Türkiye model transfers cleanly: Türkiye's import diversity rests on geography — Black Sea pipelines, two coastal LNG terminals, floating regasification — that landlocked Central Asia cannot replicate. For Tashkent, supply diversity must be engineered through pipeline interconnection and storage rather than tankers, making the downstream and storage layers even more decisive than they were for Ankara.

The bottom line. For policymakers across Central Asia the Türkiye case offers three transferable lessons: diversify the inbound chain so no single supplier or season dictates security; make the downstream investable through stable, regulated returns rather than the state balance sheet; and let the tariff fund the network, because subsidy can protect households but only a cost-reflective path keeps pipe in the ground and gas at the burner. The producer's instinct is to look at the reservoir. The importer's advantage is that it never could.

Sources: GAZBİR 2025 Natural Gas Distribution Sector Report (EPDK, TÜİK, MGM, HEPI, EuroStat); Times of Central Asia; Caspian Post; Gazeta.uz; Gas Processing & LNG. Figures reflect mid-2026 public sources.