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◆ WEEKLY INSIGHT #7☀ Renewables🌏 Central Asia

Water Is the Real Grid: Why Central Asia's Power Market Rests on a 60-Year-Old Problem

UzEnergyNews · Weekly Insight · ·7 min read·Türkçe sürümü →

Central Asia is building a regional electricity market and a green-power corridor to Europe. Both depend on a problem the region has not solved since the Soviet collapse: upstream countries need water for winter electricity, downstream countries need it for summer crops. The breakthrough now under way is not a dam — it is a trade.

The problem beneath the headlines

The headlines out of Central Asia this year are about ambition: a World Bank-backed regional electricity market (REMIT), a subsea cable to carry renewable power across the Caspian toward Europe, gigawatts of new solar and wind. Beneath all of it sits a constraint that predates every one of these projects and quietly governs whether they can work. In Central Asia, electricity and water are not two problems but one. The rivers that irrigate the cotton and wheat of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the same rivers that generate the hydropower of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. What one country does with the water in winter determines what another can grow in summer. Until that conflict is managed, no regional market is fully secure.

The Soviet bargain and its collapse

The conflict is structural, and it was once solved by design. Under the Soviet Union the system was run as a single unit. The upstream republics — Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, rich in mountain water but poor in fossil fuel — stored water through the winter and released it in summer, when the downstream republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan needed it for irrigation. In exchange, the downstream republics, rich in coal and gas, supplied the upstream ones with fuel for heating through the cold months. Water flowed down in summer; energy flowed up in winter. It was a barter, and it balanced.

Independence broke the barter. Once the republics became states with separate budgets and tariffs, the downstream countries had little reason to ship cheap fuel north, and the upstream countries had every reason to use their one abundant resource — water — to generate their own electricity when they needed it most, in winter. So Kyrgyzstan began releasing water through its dams in winter to keep the lights and heating on, sending it downstream in the cold season when no one could use it for crops, and holding too little back for the summer when the fields needed it. The same water, released at the wrong time of year, became a source of shortage at both ends: winter power crises upstream, summer irrigation shortfalls downstream.

Toktogul: the reservoir that holds the balance

No single structure embodies this better than the Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan. Sitting on the Naryn river, the main tributary of the Syr Darya, Toktogul is Kyrgyzstan's largest power station and supplies roughly 40 percent of the country's electricity. It is also the regulator of summer water for millions of hectares of farmland downstream. The two jobs pull in opposite directions, and the reservoir's water level is the scoreboard. This year it told a stark story: Toktogul held 9.14 billion cubic metres of water on 1 January 2026 and just 7 billion by 1 April, drawn down through the winter heating season. Every cubic metre spent generating winter electricity is a cubic metre not available for summer irrigation. When the reservoir runs low, both functions suffer at once — and each growing season becomes a fresh round of water-for-electricity negotiation with less room to manoeuvre.

The 2025 swap: solving it with trade, not engineering

The most important development is that the region has begun to manage the conflict with trade rather than with concrete. On 8 September 2025, at a meeting in the Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, the energy ministers and water agencies of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a package of protocols that revives the old Soviet logic in a modern form. Under the deal, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan supply Kyrgyzstan with electricity in winter; in return, Kyrgyzstan reduces its winter water releases and holds the water back in Toktogul for the downstream countries' summer irrigation. Between September 2025 and April 2026, Kazakhstan alone delivered more than 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity north under this arrangement. Kazakhstan also agreed to wheel power to Kyrgyzstan from Russia across its own grid, and Uzbekistan committed to supply southern Kazakhstan in 2026.

This is the barter rebuilt as an electricity trade. Instead of shipping coal to keep the upstream warm, the downstream countries ship kilowatt-hours; instead of being forced to spend its water on winter power, the upstream country is paid, in electricity, to keep the water in the reservoir. The mechanism that makes this scalable is precisely the regional market the World Bank is funding through REMIT: a shared market turns an awkward bilateral favour into a routine, priced transaction.

Kambarata-1 and the logic of shared ownership

The second development changes who owns the water. Kambarata-1, a long-planned hydropower plant upstream of Toktogul on the Naryn, is finally moving. The plant is designed for 1,860 megawatts behind a 256-metre dam, with a reservoir of 5.4 billion cubic metres and a construction cost of about 4.2 billion dollars. What matters is not only the megawatts but the ownership. From 2026 the plant is being financed and owned jointly: Kyrgyzstan holds 34 percent and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 33 percent each. The downstream countries are becoming co-owners of the upstream reservoir that controls their water.

That is the institutional fix the region has lacked. A new reservoir adds storage to smooth the seasonal swing between winter power and summer water. But shared ownership does something the engineering alone cannot: it gives the downstream states a direct say in how and when the water is released, and a financial stake in releasing it for irrigation rather than spilling it for winter power. Lenders have noticed — the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the European Investment Bank and the OPEC Fund have all engaged with the project. Where REMIT builds the market, Kambarata-1 builds the asset the three countries hold in common.

Rogun and the harder case

Not every upstream project follows the cooperative model, and Tajikistan's Rogun dam shows the tension that remains. On the Vakhsh river, Rogun is engineered to be the most powerful hydropower plant in Central Asia: 3,780 megawatts when complete, behind the tallest dam in the world at 335 metres, generating around 14,400 gigawatt-hours a year — roughly 70 percent of Tajikistan's current output. Two of its six units are running; a third is due in 2027. The total cost is put at about 6.2 billion dollars.

But Rogun is being built largely as a national project, and its financing has run into the limits of that approach. The World Bank approved a 350-million-dollar grant in December 2024 and then suspended further support, asking Tajikistan first to present a financing plan that does not pile on unsustainable debt, to secure long-term electricity export agreements, and to meet rigorous dam-safety standards. Tajikistan is pressing ahead, budgeting more than a billion dollars of its own money for 2026. Rogun is the counter-example to Kambarata-1: enormous potential, but built alone, with the financing, debt and downstream-water questions still unresolved. It is a reminder that the cooperative model is a choice, not a default.

The clock, and why it matters

All of this is happening against a tightening natural constraint. Central Asia's water comes from mountain glaciers and snowpack that are shrinking, and the flows of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya are becoming less reliable. Analysts have flagged the summer of 2026 as a test of whether the region's new cooperation can hold under drought. The institutions are improving at the very moment the resource is getting scarcer, and it is not yet clear which is moving faster.

The bottom line. For UzEnergyNews, the water-energy nexus is the foundation under the stories that get the headlines. The regional electricity market and the Trans-Caspian green corridor both assume that hydropower can be dispatched when it is needed — to firm up variable solar and wind, to balance the system, to fill the winter gap. That assumption only holds if the water behind the dams is managed as a shared resource rather than a national weapon. The 2025 trilateral swap and the shared ownership of Kambarata-1 are the first real evidence that the region is choosing the former. The market everyone is building is, in the end, a market in water as much as in power.

Sources: The Times of Central Asia; Eurasianet; The Astana Times; The Diplomat; The Water Diplomat; World Bank; gazeta.uz. Figures reflect mid-2026 public sources.