Moscow's Budget Cut Reaches Central Asia's Reactors
Rosatom Cuts Its Investment Programme by Half as Central Asia Reconsiders Who Builds Its Reactors
Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, is cutting its investment programme by nearly half in 2026 and targeting lower operating costs, a decision Eurasianet and Oilprice tie to the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. The company is the contracted builder of the first nuclear power plants in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and both rely on Russian state loans for most of their cost. The cut was reported on 20 July, barely seven weeks after the first concrete was poured at Uzbekistan's 2.1 gigawatt Jizzakh plant, a project of about 9.5 billion dollars financed 85 to 90 percent by Russian loans. In Kazakhstan the pattern is further along: the 15 billion dollar Balkhash financing agreed in April remains unsigned, and Astana has handed a second and a third plant to China's national nuclear corporation. Both capitals are also in talks with the United States over small modular reactors. The reactors will still be built; the open question is whose balance sheet stands behind them.
Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation, is cutting its investment programme by nearly half this year and aims to reduce operating costs by about 10 percent within eighteen months, its chief executive Alexei Likhachev has said, describing a set of projects that the company has either abandoned or rescheduled against an efficiency test applied to 2030. Reported by Eurasianet and Oilprice on 20 July 2026 and framed as a consequence of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on the company's financing, the decision matters well beyond Russia, because Rosatom is the contracted builder of the first nuclear power plants in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and both projects depend on Russian state loans for the greater part of their cost.
The cut lands weeks after first concrete in Uzbekistan
The timing is close. On 5 June 2026, less than seven weeks before the investment decision was reported, the first concrete was poured at Uzbekistan's first nuclear power plant in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region, at a ceremony attended remotely by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Shavkat Mirziyoyev from the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. The plant is unusual by design: two VVER-1000 Generation III-plus reactors of about one gigawatt each will share a single 525-hectare site near Lake Tuzkan with two RITM-200N small modular reactors of 55 megawatts each, for a combined capacity of about 2.1 gigawatts. It is the first time large and small nuclear units will be built together on one site, and the first nuclear plant anywhere in post-Soviet Central Asia. Officials expect it to generate roughly 17.2 terawatt-hours a year, close to 15 percent of national electricity demand, with the small modular units targeted for 2029 and the two large reactors for 2033 and 2035. The exposure is financial rather than physical. The project is costed at about 9.5 billion dollars, of which 85 to 90 percent is to be financed through Russian state loans, which places the timetable of the build in direct contact with the health of Rosatom's balance sheet. No delay specific to Jizzakh has been announced, and construction has visibly begun; what the investment cut changes is the confidence attached to the schedule.
Kazakhstan shows the same strain, one step earlier
Kazakhstan illustrates what financial strain looks like before the concrete is poured. In April 2026 Astana and Moscow agreed that Russia would cover about 85 percent of the roughly 15 billion dollar cost of the country's first nuclear power plant at Lake Balkhash, but months later the financing agreement remains unsigned, and Rosatom's difficulties have already cost a Russian contractor its work on Kazakh thermal plants. Likhachev's retrenchment casts further doubt on whether the Balkhash plant can meet its tentative completion date in the middle of the next decade. Astana has not waited. In June 2026 Kazakhstan awarded a contract for a second nuclear power plant to China's National Nuclear Corporation, and indicated that the same company would lead a third, a decision that moves a meaningful part of the country's nuclear programme outside the Russian orbit while the first plant is still unbuilt.
The contest for who builds Central Asia's reactors
Rosatom's export model has rested on financing as much as on engineering. State loans covering most of the cost, repaid over decades, have made Russian reactors affordable for governments that could not fund them alone, and have tied those governments to Moscow for the sixty-year life of the plant. A halving of the investment programme tests that model at its foundation, because the loans are as much the product as the reactors. Both Central Asian governments are now widening their options, holding talks over small modular reactors with the United States and, in Kazakhstan's case, contracting China directly. None of this cancels the Uzbek plant, and Russian-financed nuclear remains the most advanced option on the table in both countries. What has changed is the certainty around it. For a region setting electricity records every summer and counting on firm low-carbon capacity to meet them, the question is no longer only which reactor to build, but whose balance sheet will still stand behind it when the concrete is finished. The variables to watch through the rest of 2026 are whether the Balkhash financing is signed, whether any Jizzakh milestone slips, and how far Tashkent and Astana carry their conversations with Beijing and Washington.