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A Century After the Mosul Settlement, Türkiye Returns to Kirkuk — as Transit State and Equity Partner

Türkiye and Iraq Rebuild the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Corridor: A New Transit Deal, a TPAO Stake in Kirkuk, and a Century-Old Circle Closing

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In the six days between 27 July and 1 August 2026, the energy architecture between Türkiye and Iraq was dismantled and rebuilt. On 27 July the treaty of 1973 that had governed the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline for fifty-two years expired, terminated by presidential decision published a year earlier. On 28 July, Türkiye's national oil company TPAO took a 15 percent stake in the BP-led company redeveloping the Kirkuk oil fields. And on 1 August, BOTAŞ signed a one-year transit arrangement with Iraq's SOMO and North Oil Company covering a daily capacity of 750,000 barrels through the pipeline to the Mediterranean. The timing is not incidental: the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz collapsed Iraqi export revenues from about 6 billion dollars a month to under 2 billion, and repriced every overland corridor in the region. There is also a longer arc. The Treaty of Ankara, signed on 5 June 1926, settled the Mosul question and gave Türkiye a 10 percent share of the new Iraqi state's oil royalties for twenty-five years. A century later, almost to the year, Türkiye returns to Kirkuk — this time as transit state and equity partner.

In the six days between 27 July and 1 August 2026, the energy relationship between Türkiye and Iraq was taken apart and reassembled on new foundations. The sequence matters. On 27 July, the intergovernmental treaty of 1973 that had served as the legal constitution of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline system for more than half a century expired, terminated by a Turkish presidential decision published in the Official Gazette a year earlier. On 28 July, Türkiye's national oil company TPAO finalised a 15 percent interest in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited, the vehicle redeveloping the Kirkuk fields, alongside BP with 43 percent and ConocoPhillips with 42. And on 1 August, following Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's visit to Ankara days earlier, the Turkish state pipeline company BOTAŞ signed a one-year arrangement with Iraq's state oil marketer SOMO and the North Oil Company covering a daily transit capacity of 750,000 barrels through the pipeline to the Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar presented the arrangement as a bridge while negotiations continue toward a new long-term agreement; al-Zaidi described a framework that would extend beyond oil to electricity and water resources.

What the transit deal does and does not restore

The numbers require care, because three different figures describe the same pipe. The nameplate capacity of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan system is about 1.5 million barrels per day. The new arrangement covers a transit capacity of 750,000 barrels per day, which is a contractual envelope rather than a delivery commitment. Actual flows are far below both: recent reporting puts them in a range of roughly 170,000 to 250,000 barrels per day. The gap between the envelope and the meters is the story of the past three years. Türkiye halted the line in March 2023 after an international arbitration tribunal awarded Iraq about 1.5 billion dollars over exports of Kurdish crude between 2014 and 2018 that Baghdad had not authorised; a second case, covering the years to 2023, remains pending. The route then stayed shut for two and a half years while Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara argued over payment mechanics — the Kurdistan region's prime minister has put the cumulative economic loss above 25 billion dollars — before reopening in September 2025 at modest volumes, and from March 2026, under a revenue arrangement between Baghdad and Erbil, the North Oil Company resumed exports from the federal Kirkuk fields. The expiry of the 1973 treaty, far from being a rupture, cleared the legal ground: a framework written for a state-to-state pipeline in the age of OPEC embargoes was replaced within days by a commercial transit arrangement between companies, with a comprehensive intergovernmental accord under negotiation behind it.

The equity layer: TPAO enters the Kirkuk cluster

The transit deal is the visible half of the architecture. The quieter half is upstream. TPAO's 15 percent interest sits inside the BP-led redevelopment of the Kirkuk cluster, covering the Baba and Avanah domes of the Kirkuk field itself together with Bai Hassan, Jambur and Khabbaz, an initial phase the partners size at more than three billion barrels of oil equivalent, with Iraq's North Oil Company and North Gas Company retaining operating roles and the fields remaining Iraqi state property. This is where the historical resonance becomes precise rather than rhetorical. The Treaty of Ankara, signed on 5 June 1926 between Türkiye, Britain and Iraq, settled the Mosul question, the last open territorial issue of the post-Ottoman settlement, by confirming Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah within British-mandate Iraq, along the frontier the League of Nations had drawn a few months earlier; in exchange, Türkiye was to receive 10 percent of Iraq's oil royalties for twenty-five years. Oil was struck at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk the following year, and Türkiye collected royalty payments from 1931 onward — historical accounts differ on how long the payments ran and how the balance was finally settled. A century on, the position is structurally different: what was a passive royalty across a newly settled border is now negotiated equity in the same geology, held by a Turkish state company inside an international consortium, at Baghdad's invitation. The circle that opened with the Mosul settlement closes not with a border but with a cap table.

Why now: the corridor premium

None of this happened in a vacuum. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year forced Iraq, which ships the overwhelming share of its crude through Gulf terminals, into an export crisis: shipments collapsed by more than 80 percent in the weeks after the strikes on Iran, and monthly oil revenues fell from around 6 billion dollars to under 2 billion. Tanker transits through the strait remain sharply below normal, and every barrel of pipeline capacity that reaches the Mediterranean without passing Hormuz now carries a strategic premium that did not exist eighteen months ago. For Baghdad, the northern corridor is export insurance and budget repair. For Ankara, it restores throughput to Ceyhan, anchors the energy leg of a relationship that both governments want to extend to natural gas, electricity and water, and positions Türkiye as the western outlet for Iraqi hydrocarbons while the Development Road corridor, with phased horizons running to 2050, is still being built. Iraqi officials have floated lifting the route toward one million barrels per day; the distance between that number and the meters is the measure to watch. The watchpoints for the next twelve months are concrete: whether actual flows climb toward the 750,000-barrel envelope, whether the payment mechanics that broke the route in 2023 are resolved durably between Baghdad and Erbil, and whether the comprehensive accord now under negotiation converts a one-year bridge into the corridor's second half-century. The first century of the Türkiye-Iraq oil relationship began with a treaty that moved a border. The second is beginning with contracts that move barrels.

Sources: Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Türkiye statements and Anadolu Agency reporting via TRT Haber and Yeni Şafak (1-2 August 2026); Al Jazeera (1 August 2026) for the BOTAS-SOMO/NOC arrangement, capacity and flow figures, and Iraqi export impact of the Hormuz closure; Forbes (29 July 2026) for the TPAO 15 percent interest in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited, consortium shares and field scope; Iraq Oil Report, Al-Monitor and Turkish Official Gazette reporting (July 2025 - July 2026) for the termination and expiry of the 1973 pipeline treaty; International Chamber of Commerce arbitration outcome as reported by Reuters and Iraqi News (2023); Treaty of Ankara of 5 June 1926 and the Mosul question per standard historical records, including the 10 percent royalty provision and its later commutation. Copyrighted material is not reproduced. Analysis by UzEnergyNews.